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Abstract 
This paper assesses how China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) can bring investment and technology 
into ASEAN and its impact on ASEAN’s electricity market. With the theoretical framework of scenario 
analysis, this paper provides three scenarios for ASEAN electricity market integration: the Lao PDR-
Thailand-Malaysia-Singapore (LTMS) arrangement, a power exchange between heterogeneous grids 
in the GMS region, and a fully competitive electricity market with a fully-developed ASEAN Power 
Grid (APG). Based on these scenarios, the paper examines the extent to which the BRI can assist 
electricity market integration in the ASEAN region. It is found that BRI can best fit with and facilitate 
the first scenario. Given the uncertain outlook for the electricity market integration in the GMS 
region, how China’s BRI can play a role in facilitating the GMS electricity market integration is not 
clear under the second scenario. Further, BRI may be less helpful in the third scenario in which the 
region’s master plan of APG would be realized. In any sense, how BRI can fit with and facilitate 
ASEAN’s electricity market integration would more depend on the host countries rather than the 
Chinese side. 




1. Introduction  
The Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) has a long established plan to connect the national 
grids of its member states and create an ASEAN power grid (APG). Currently the interconnection of 
grids are mostly in the continental Southeast Asia and the electricity trading still remains bilateral and 
the realization of the ambitious plan needs significant amount of investment in the electricity sector. 
More recently, ASEAN has announced the intention to promote multilateral power trading and 
develop an integrated regional power market. 
Against this backdrop, China has emerged as a major investor in the region’s electricity industry. China 
indeed has a long history of investing in ASEAN’s energy sector, but since the 2000s Chinese energy 
companies have been increasingly active in this region. They have been building coal-fired power 
plants and hydroelectric dams, and have invested in renewables energy. With regard to Chinese 
investment in energy connectivity infrastructure, China appears to be very interested in building 
transmission lines in its neighboring countries so that these lines can be connected with those in China. 
Therefore, China-built lines are mainly located in mainland Southeast Asia, in Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar 
and Cambodia. 
Since the launch of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinese investment in Southeast Asia has 
increased. Chinese companies have been particularly active building coal-fired power plants in 
Indonesia, in direct response to the government’s ambitious plans to boost the nation’s generating 
capacity as fast as possible. China continues to be active in hydropower construction in the Greater 
Mekong Sub-region (GMS) (Lu 2016). It is also building solar and wind farms and manufacturing 
facilities for solar panels in Southeast Asia, although the scale is small compared to its investment in 
the hydropower sector. One BRI power grid project has also been put into operation: the so called 
‘first Belt & Road power grid cooperation project’ in Laos, which is also connected to power grids in 
Southern China (Xinhua 2015). 
The aim of this paper is to examine the extent to which the BRI can assist electricity market integration 
in the ASEAN region. Using the framework of scenario analysis, this study presents three scenarios of 
electricity market integration in ASEAN and assesses how China’s BRI might fit with each scenario. The 
three scenarios are: the Lao PDR-Thailand-Malaysia-Singapore (LTMS) arrangement, a power 
exchange between heterogeneous grids, and a fully competitive electricity market with a fully-
developed ASEAN Power Grid. It is found that BRI can best fit with and facilitate the first scenario. 
Chinese companies, with their existing investments in the power sector in the continental Southeast 
Asian countries such as Laos and Thailand, can provide indirect support to this scenario; and probably 
direct support when further down investments in Malaysia and Singapore are made. Yet given the 
uncertain outlook for the electricity market integration in the GMS region, how China’s BRI can play a 
role in facilitating the GMS electricity market integration is not clear under the second scenario. 
Further, BRI may be less helpful in the third scenario in which the region’s master plan of ASEAN Power 
Grid would be realized. In any sense, how BRI can fit with and facilitate ASEAN’s electricity market 
integration would more depend on the host countries rather than the Chinese side.  
This paper is structured as the following: section 2 reviews energy situation and the political economy 
of energy market integration in ASEAN; section 3 establishes the analytic framework of scenario 
analysis with a discussion of the rationale for scenario analysis of ASEAN’s electricity market 
integration; section 4 discusses in detail the current electricity market in ASEAN and each of the three 
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scenarios of its market integration; section 5 discusses how China’s BRI can fit with each scenario; and 
section 6 concludes the paper.   
2. The context of electricity market integration in ASEAN 
Energy market integration cannot be viewed in isolation from the broader political economy of ASEAN 
integration. This section reviews the energy situation of ASEAN and examines the political economy 
of energy market integration in ASEAN in order to build a better understanding of different scenarios 
of electricity market integration in this region which is discussed in the subsequent sections.  
2.1 Energy Situation in ASEAN 
The ten ASEAN member states are at different stages in their economic development, yet most of 
them have rapid economic growth and are experiencing significant increase in energy demand. 
Between 2000 and 2016, they collectively experienced economic growth of more than 125 per cent, 
reaching a combined GDP of US$7.4 trillion in 2016 (in purchasing power parity terms) (OECD/IEA 
2017, 34). That year, total primary energy demand in ASEAN reached 643 Mtoe, of which fossil fuel 
accounted for 74 per cent (OECD/IEA 2017). Figure 1 illustrates the fuel mix in ASEAN in 2016.  
Figure 1: Fuel mix in ASEAN, 2016 
 
Source: OECD/IEA (2017). 
In terms of electricity supply, ASEAN’s installed power generation capacity more than doubled over 
the same period, reaching around 240 gigawatts in 2016. Fossil fuels continue to dominate the power 
generation mix. There has been a rapid rise of coal-fired power capacity, although the growth has 
been slowing down since 2014. The capacity of renewables-based electricity has tripled since 2000, 
with a rapid expansion of hydropower. In 2016, non-hydro renewables accounted for 6.5 per cent of 
the total installed electricity capacity. Bioenergy and geothermal capacity contributed to about 70 per 
cent of the non-hydro renewables (OECD/IEA 2017, 23). Figure 2 shows the power generation mix in 
Southeast Asia in 2016. 










Source: OECD/IEA (2017). 
Besides increasing electricity capacity, ASEAN has also been putting efforts to expanding power 
connectivity. Linkage of power grids across countries has long been pursued. Adopted in 1997 at the 
2nd ASEAN Informal Summit, the ASEAN 2020 Vision envisioned an energy-interconnected Southeast 
Asia through two major energy projects: the ASEAN Power Grid (APG) and the Trans-ASEAN Gas 
Pipeline (TAGP). The APG was proposed for the aim of sharing resources and promoting the efficient 
utilization of electricity. Through power trading, APG has also been expected to promote a win-win 
economic relationship between the countries (APAEC 2004). Therefore, APG is one of the most 
important elements for electricity market integration in ASEAN. The benefits of an integrated ASEAN 
electricity market are obvious. Trans-border power grid interconnections and market integration can 
relieve burdens related to excess power generation capacity, alleviate poverty, reduce energy prices, 
mitigate supply shortages, and promote development of clean energy and sustainability. Further, 
economic analysis has identified more benefits such as significant net economic savings via 
development of cheaper renewable energy resources (Silitonga 2018).  
2.2 The political economy of electricity market integration in ASEAN 
An applicable approach to understanding the political economy of energy market integration of 
Southeast Asia is offered by the ‘Murdoch school’, which posits that institutional outcomes (e.g., 
energy market integration) are inherently determined by rival actors that consistently compete for 
power and resources (Jones 2016). Against this backdrop, the member states that demonstrate more 
enthusiasm for further integration may need to take a proactive approach in understanding the 
difficulties faced by other member states that are hesitant at best and resistant at worst. Since the 
benefits accruing from a fully integrated energy market will only be realized in the long term, some 
member states seem to discount their potential gains right now. This impacts the political will of each 
member state to act urgently. In any sense, as Andrews-Speed and Hezri (2013) pointed out, the 
operation of a regional energy grid requires a high degree of collective action, which is likely to require 
delegation of sovereignty of the participating countries. ASEAN, a region with ten diversified member 
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To address the complexities of the underlying political economy, there is a need for clarity on the 
decision-making mechanism with regard to energy market integration. This pertains to who will make 
decisions, and how such power will be distributed across different members in this regard. For 
instance, Nordic energy cooperation relies on consensus among its members (Joergensen 2016). Thus 
the Nordic power market, ‘Nordpool’, developed slowly, starting with bilateral exchange between 
Norway and Sweden, grew to include Denmark and Finland, and eventually integrated with the 
European Union market (Bredersen and Nilsen 2013). There is also a need for unambiguous clarity 
among members as to what kind of public good is aspired to be created, and what benefits are 
expected to be achieved (Andrews-Speed 2011). Matters related to benefits and costs cannot have 
national basis only, as it potentially affects the wellbeing of millions of people living in the member 
states. Again, as ASEAN member states are quite diverse in terms of economic development, political 
system, and natural resource endowment, it can be even more difficult for them agree on the benefits, 
costs and people’s wellbeing of an integrated energy market. 
Further, trust is an important requirement for collective action and a prerequisite for a high level of 
energy market integration. However, a lack of political trust is a prominent obstacle that hinders 
collective action in the ASEAN region. The reasons lie in its history. Most ASEAN member states are 
young nations that emerged from colonial rule and the Second World War in weak condition. This 
makes them very sensitive about sovereignty (Andrews-Speed and Len, date). To make matters worse, 
factors such as unresolved disputes over land borders and maritime demarcation and ethnic unrest in 
border areas make the ASEAN countries tend to look at each other with suspicion. For example, there 
has still been disputes on the border issue between Vietnam and Cambodia. Their border disputes had 
led the Vietnamese to invade Cambodia in the late 1970s. Today still little progress on boundary 
agreements have been made between the two countries. Further, as one of the most ethnically 
diverse regions in the world, ethnic unrest frequently happens in the region. In Myanmar, for instance, 
the escalation of conflict in Kachin state between the army and the Kachin Independence Organisation 
(KIO) highlights the ethnic issues in the country. The violence has mainly centred on the control of 
natural resources such as amber mines, jade mines and hydropower plants (Hart 2018). This can make 
the investment in Myanmar a complicated issue.  
Besides the above obstacles that may hinder the integration of energy markets, some other challenges 
particularly impede the development of an integrated electricity market in ASEAN, such as the 
technical, economic, and institutional and market structure challenges and energy security concerns 
of member states. First, the technical challenge is a major obstacle for the multilateral connections 
needed to create an ASEAN Power Grid (APG). The power systems of ASEAN member states have 
different technical standards and their transmission lines may also have different voltages. The 
existing power grid interconnections serve as a bad example that hinders the progress of the APG. For 
example, most of the electricity exported from the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) member states 
is from generating plants that are independent of the national grids. These electricity transmission 
lines are built exclusively for exporting electricity, and these electricity flows are small and 
unidirectional. However, if a large interconnected system is to be developed, it is necessary to 
coordinate the technical standards and align the standards for electricity-exporting grids with the 
standards of domestic grids that had not been designed specifically for exports of electricity (Shi and 




Second, investment constitutes a key uncertainty in the expansion of interconnected power grids 
across ASEAN. Since the early 2000s, average annual investment in power plants more than doubled, 
while the average annual investment in transmission and distribution systems remained almost flat 
(IEA 2015). Financing cross-border transmission lines will require substantial investment yet it is 
unclear where the funding is going to come from. Since 2000, about US$ 365 billion has been invested 
in the power sector across ASEAN, of which about US$ 195 billion went to grid expansion and 
improvement. However, it is estimated that ASEAN would need about US$ 690 billion invested in its 
transmission and distribution sectors by 2040 (IEA 2017). Completion of some interconnections is 
more realistic than others thanks to the existing funding from development banks and private sector. 
Yet there is uncertainty about the future of some other interconnections due to lack of funding, 
although their benefit to the region is undeniable (Finenko, Owen and Tao 2017).  
Another major constraint for APG development is that many interconnection projects are not yet 
commercially viable which makes it difficult to secure financing (Shi and Malik, 2013). The prevailing 
subsidies in many ASEAN countries not only discourage investment in clean energy, fossil fuel 
exploration, and infrastructure, but also prevent greater integration of regional energy markets  (Shi 
and Kimura, 2013). The removal of subsidies, however, is politically challenging, as has been the case 
of Malaysia (Li et al., 2017). The predominance of 25-year power purchase agreements (PPAs) in the 
governance of most of the interconnections, is a further commercial factor that prevents the 
development of multilateral power trading (Antikainen et al., 2011). 
Third, institutional challenges further complicate the situation and different modes of power sector 
regulation can bring about further obstacles. Of the ten ASEAN member states, only Singapore has a 
fully liberalized electricity market. Among ASEAN countries, the Philippines comes second to 
Singapore in terms of having single buyer pools in certain parts of the electricity network. Malaysia 
and Thailand both have IPPs but they do not have single buyer pools. Other countries such as 
Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos are served by vertically-integrated state-owned utilities. Price control 
mechanisms and electricity subsidies in several ASEAN countries are also potential obstacles to the 
APG development and electricity market integration in ASEAN (Sahid, et al. 2013). Another regulatory 
obstacle is different degrees of liberalization in the transmission sector. For example, private 
companies in Indonesia are allowed to construct transmission lines, whereas in Malaysia, only the 
state-owned utility company can build transmission lines (Shi and Malik 2013). As a result, electricity 
trading has a lengthy approval process due to the different nature of the leading companies of both 
countries in the market. Consequently, the harmonisation of regulatory systems will need a lengthy 
developmental process. 
Finally, the prevailing nationally-focused energy security paradigm of ASEAN member states lies 
behind the continuing fragmentation of the energy markets because the traditional national energy 
security concept requires maximising self-sufficiency which undermines potential for regional energy 
trade (Shi and Kimura, 2010; Wu et al., 2013). In addition, some countries may limit their dependence 
on other countries to protect their electricity utilities. These energy sector concerns will reduce the 
electricity trading opportunities (Shi and Malik 2013). Countries will have to balance the trade-offs 
between possibly cheaper and cleaner electricity from overseas and national security. If a country 
becomes reliant on electricity exports, it faces the risk of electricity supply interruption by the exporter. 
Interruption can be intentional or unintentional. For example, if there is a drought in a big exporting 
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country that relies on hydropower generation, such as Laos, the reliance on such an exporter may also 
cause serious problem for the importing country.  
Further energy market integration will need to be based on projection of different possible forms of 
integration that may affect the energy market of the individual member state and the region as a 
whole. To look into the trajectories of energy market integration, this study adopts scenario analysis, 
focusing on the projection of ASEAN’s electricity market integration. Scenario analysis has been 
developed since the 1960s to produce extrapolations that predict the future. The next section 
discusses the framework of scenario analysis that is applied to electricity market in ASEAN. 
3. The framework for understanding market integration: scenario 
analysis 
Since the 1960s, more sophisticated forecasting techniques which can produce extrapolations to 
predict the future have been developed. One of these techniques is the scenario analysis. Scenario 
analysis is a powerful tool to react to future conditions and to develop strategies to address such 
conditions. Scenarios provide a long-term macro view which serves as a backdrop for more traditional 
forecasting approaches. The methodology of scenario analysis has been extensively used for policy 
analysis, social forecasting, and decision making in 1960s. In the late 1980s, it matured as a well-
developed planning and forecasting technique. Scenario analysis provides a powerful tool to react to 
future conditions and to develop strategies to address such conditions. This methodology is best in 
use when scenarios are suited in “long-term, macro, uncertain environments which are typified by a 
scarcity of data and a large number of non-quantifiable factors” (Huss 1988, 380). In this section, we 
review the state of the art associated with scenario analysis and provide the rationale for scenario 
analysis in electricity market integration in ASEAN. 
3.1 State of the art of scenario analysis  
Scenarios provide a long-term macro view which serves as a backdrop for more traditional forecasting 
approaches. The methodology of scenario analysis has been extensively used for policy analysis, social 
forecasting, and decision making in 1960s. Helping the decision-makers to be prepared for the future, 
scenario analysis deals with uncertainty and the usefulness of overall decision-making process 
(Heijden 2005; Varum and Melo 2010).  
It provides an overall picture of the future and highlights the interactions among several trends and 
events in the future (Martino 2003). Moreover, it integrates all complex elements to describe a future 
situation and the course of events which allows the decision-makers to move forward from the actual 
to the future situation. Therefore, scenario analysis is considered a valuable tool that helps decision-
makers to prepare for possible eventualities. Until now the most popular definition of scenario is that 
scenarios are alternative futures resulting from a combination of trends and of the policies of agents 
(Fontela and Hingel 1993, 139).1 
On different basis, scenarios can be classified into different types. They can be grouped and classified 
on the basis of topic, perspective (Porter, et al. 2011), scope, focus of action, level of aggregation 
(Mietzner and Reger 2005), and methods of building (van Notten, et al. 2003). Particularly, perspective 
and methods of building are most relevant to the study in this paper. On the basis of perspective, 
                                                          
1 For a comprehensive literature review of scenario analysis, see Amer, Daim and Jetter (2013). 
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scenarios can be classified into descriptive and normative scenarios. According to Porter, et al. (2011), 
descriptive scenarios are extrapolative in nature and present a range of events that describe 
alternative futures whereas normative scenarios are goal-directed and passively react to policy 
planning concerns for the achievement of desired targets. On the basis of methods of building, 
scenarios can be qualitative and quantitative. Georgoff and Murdick (1986) published a paper in 
Harvard Business Review that explicitly specifies scenario analysis as a qualitative technique designed 
as “smoothly unfolding narratives that describe an assumed future expressed through a sequence of 
time frames or snapshots” (p. 114), while as of the past decade, many have been making extensive 
use of quantitative tool and techniques (Vecchiato and Roveda 2010). This study adopts the 
descriptive scenario with a qualitative technique to forecast the future of electricity market in 
Southeast Asia.  
3.2 Rationale for scenario analysis in electricity market integration in ASEAN 
Despite of these perceived benefits, the progress of ASEAN electricity market integration still remains 
slow given the obstacles discussed in section 2. These obstacles are difficult to overcome. Of all the 
obstacles, the technical incompatibility of transmission lines between some ASEAN countries need to 
be addressed before other problems can be solved. Further, technically if connected, the unstable 
voltage and frequent power outages in some poorest countries in the region such as Cambodia, Laos 
and Myanmar can seriously affect the overall performance of the regional power grid (Zhang and Zha 
2014). Political distrust between some of the ASEAN countries involved in the integration can hinder 
the interconnection of power grids across their borders (Shi and Kimura, 2013; Wu et al., 2012). As a 
result, some governments would boost their own electricity capacity rather than save costs by 
connecting to their neighbors’ grids (Olchondra 2016) while some other governments are less keen to 
support APG due to the need to protect their own energy sectors (Kumar 2015).  
National energy market regulations have delayed the development of APG as well. Electricity is often 
the most regulated energy product of a country. To break up monopolies and attract investment, 
electricity sector liberalization has been implemented across ASEAN to varying degrees since the 
1980s. Many targets, however, have not been achieved yet (Sharma 2005). Regulation gaps of 
mismatches have impeded cross-border power trading, including issues such as taxation, transmission 
tariffs, and third-party access (Andrews-Speed 2016). Another major obstacle is the lack of capital. The 
investment requirement of eventual realization of APG is estimated to be US$5.9 billion (Zhang and 
Zha 2014, 92). However, as Andrews-Speed (2016) mentioned, “[n]ational governments and state-
owned enterprises have been unable, unwilling or slow to invest and, at the same time, many 
interconnection projects remain commercially unattractive to private investors” (p. 11).  
The difficulty of removing these obstacles produces a lot of uncertainties for the evolving of APG and 
electricity market integration. With this said, our study evaluates what are the likely trajectories of 
the evolving electricity market integration. For such evaluation, scenarios offer a powerful approach 




4. Scenarios for ASEAN electricity market integration  
This section reviews the current situation of ASEAN power grid connection and forecasts the ASEAN 
electricity market integration scenarios. 
4.1 Current situation of ASEAN power grid connectivity 
Linkage of power grids across countries has long been pursued in ASEAN. Adopted in 1997 at the 2nd 
ASEAN Informal Summit, the ASEAN 2020 Vision proposed an energy-interconnected Southeast Asia 
through two major energy projects: the ASEAN Power Grid (APG) and the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline 
(TAGP). The APG was proposed for the aim of sharing resources and promoting the efficient utilization 
of electricity (ASEAN, 2008; Shi, 2014). Through power trading, the APG has also been expected to 
promote a win-win economic relationship between the countries. Therefore, APG is one of the most 
important elements for electricity market integration in ASEAN. Yet the development of APG has 
encountered technical, political, institutional, and financial obstacles. These factors, among others, 
also affect ASEAN electricity market integration (Halawa et al., 2018; Shi, 2014). Nevertheless, the 
basic foundation and also the most important prerequisite is the physical cross-border 
interconnection of national power grids across ASEAN. ASEAN has been endeavoring to construct the 
ASEAN Power Grid (APG) since 1997 when HAPUA (Heads of ASEAN Power Utilities/Authorities) was 
tasked to ensure regional energy security by sharing energy resources via APG (ACE 2017a). Currently, 
there are totally 16 planned APG projects, 8 of which have been completed. APG is still at the stage of 
physical interconnection development between individual member states  (ACE 2017b, 9).  However, 
even if all these interconnections are realized as planned, APG does not by itself bring about an 
integrated ASEAN electricity market (Shi, 2014; Shi and Malik, 2013).  
4.2 ASEAN electricity market integration scenarios 
Nonetheless, the integration of the market has to start in a gradual and incremental way, and the 
bottom-up approach is more suitable for ASEAN than the top-down one. ASEAN does not have any 
institution that represents a strong supranational authority, nor does it have an overall regional 
governance to facilitate the development of regional power connectivity. Therefore, a bottom-up and 
incremental approach is practical to advance regional power connectivity in the absence of an overall 
regional integration architecture. In order to pursue the APG programme, HAPUA adopted a strategy 
that encourages the gradual development of the identified interconnection projects. First on cross-
border bilateral terms, then gradually expanding to a sub-regional basis and finally to a totally 
integrated Southeast Asian power grid system (Shi and Malik 2013). This sub-section constructs three 
scenarios of ASEAN electricity market integration with a discussion of how China’s BRI can play a role 
under each scenario. 
Scenario 1: Lao PDR-Thailand-Malaysia-Singapore (LTMS) Interconnection 
Currently all power trading within ASEAN is bilateral between individual member states. ASEAN is yet 
to develop its first multilateral connection so as to initiate multilateral electricity trade by 2018. Using 
existing interconnections, the pilot project ‘Lao PDR-Thailand-Malaysia-Singapore (LTMS) Power 
Integration Project (PIP)’ was intended to start multilateral electricity trade from Laos to Singapore, 
through Malaysia and Thailand. This pilot project was expected to be a pathfinder to realise 
multilateral electricity trade in the ASEAN (ACE 2017b). Under the first phase of the LTMS Project, 100 
MW of electrical power would be delivered to Malaysia via Thailand’s national grid by 1 August 
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2018. Under the second phase, it is expected that Laos will export another 100 MW of power to 
Singapore via Thailand and Malaysia’s network by 2020 (Lao News Agency 2017; The Laotian Times 
2017). However, the involvement of Singapore is more complex on account of the specific context of 
its power sector. In principle, the availability of hydropower from Laos would diversify Singapore’s fuel 
mix, enhance security of supply and reduce carbon emissions. However, Singapore not only hosts the 
only fully liberalized power market in ASEAN, but this market has massive generation overcapacity. If 
the power available via LTMS was truly competitive in this market, the existing generating companies 
might be driven out of business. Conversely, if the transmission tariffs charged by Thailand and 
Malaysia were high, the power from Laos would not be able to enter the Singapore market without 
special dispensation. Therefore, Singapore has withdrawn from the LTMS project for the moment.  
From the perspective of energy security concerns, Malaysia and Thailand have the motivation to meet 
their rapidly growing electricity demand without increasing their dependence on natural gas imports 
for power generation. On the exporter side, Laos is keen to be the battery of Southeast Asia. It has 
large hydropower potential and it expects to operate 100 hydropower plants with combined installed 
generation capacity of 28 GW by 2020 (Phomnuny 2017).  
Scenario 2: Multilateral power exchange 
Although ASEAN has already established some institutions to develop APG, such as ASEAN Centre for 
Energy (ACE) and Heads of ASEAN Power Utilities/Authorities (HAPUA), none of them have binding 
authority. There is still a long way to go before ASEAN can uniformly make rules to create a truly 
competitive ASEAN-wide electricity market due to the big differences in the national conditions of the 
individual countries. Therefore, at the current stage, due to technical, regulatory and other barriers, 
it may only be possible initially to create a multilateral power exchange platform involving willing 
participants. But as more countries join and as market actors realise the advantage of trading power, 
investment in interconnection will grow and the sophistication of trading mechanisms will increase. 
That is to say, to first establish the market can bring in investment and expansion of power grids. Such 
an approach was taken by the Nordic countries in developing the Nordpool and is currently being 
pursued in other regions, notably in the Southern African Power Pool (Bredesen and Nilsen 2013). 
The Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) could be a good place to test such an exchange due to the 
relatively high level of interconnection. Currently electricity trade in GMS is only conducted through 
PPAs between utilities. The ideal condition of the electricity market integration in the region would be 
the establishment of a regional electricity exchange center with multiple buyers and sellers within the 
GMS countries that could then expand across the rest of ASEAN. Countries with huge hydropower 
potential such as Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia can be electricity exporters while countries with large 
electricity demand such as Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam would be the importers. Under such 
scenario, according to a study done by ADB (2009), Thailand would be the dominant importer of 
electricity, which primarily comes from Myanmar through Laos. Located in the center of the 
continental Southeast Asia, Thailand can be a trading hub of electricity.  
The GMS power market integration was planned to be progressed into several stages from bilateral 
cross-border connection and grid-to-grid power trading between any pair of GMS countries to  
transmission links for cross-border trading using third party’s transmission facilities and a fully 
integrated GMS regional competitive power market. GMS countries are now moving from the stage 
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of bilateral electricity trading to trading between any pair of GMS countries with access to third 
country’s transmission facilities (ADB 2018).  
 
Scenario 3: A fully competitive electricity market with a fully-developed APG 
Under this scenario, there will be comprehensive regulatory, institutional and market arrangements 
based on the ASEAN countries’ high-level cooperation and trust. This scenario, a fully-developed APG, 
is a major energy infrastructure project mandated in 1997 by the ASEAN Heads of States/Governments 
under the ASEAN Vision 2020. Motivations for a full APG are to complement different load shape 
among ASEAN countries and to make ASEAN less dependent on fuel imports from non-ASEAN 
countries. Further, energy resources sharing and potential total cost savings from interconnection are 
beneficial to the ASEAN region as well (Shi and Malik 2013). The ultimate goal of APG is to interconnect 
the grids of all the 10 ASEAN member states to optimize the use of energy resources in the region by 
sharing the benefits and to reduce capital required for the expansion of generation capacity. In such 
a fully competitive power market, there will be vertical unbundling of state-owned utilities. There will 
also be full independence of transmission system operators from electricity production. More 
importantly, a fully competitive power market has unrestricted and non-discriminatory third-party 
grid access to all participants (Finenko, Owen and Tao 2017), which would be one of the key 
characteristics in the fully competitive power market. Against this condition,  comprehensive 
institutional arrangement including summits, ministerial meetings and senior official meetings are 
needed. 
5. The role of BRI under ASEAN electricity market integration 
With these scenarios in mind, this section discusses how China’s BRI can bring new source of 
technology and funding to the electricity market integration of ASEAN under each scenario.  
5.1 BRI under scenario 1 
We find that of the three scenarios, BRI can play the most important role under scenario 1, the LTMS 
interconnection. China has long invested in the power sector in the continental Southeast Asia. These 
investments are in projects that increase power capacity or expand power connectivity within the 
borders of the host country. In its neighboring countries Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar, Chinese 
companies have also built national power transmission lines that can be connected to China’s power 
grid to enable electricity trading. Although these connections operate on a bilateral basis, they are 
beneficial to the power grid building of these continental Southeast Asian countries. Since BRI was 
initiated, one ‘BRI power grid project’ has been put into operation   ̶ the ‘first Belt & Road power grid 
cooperation project’ located in Laos. Constructed by China Southern Power Grid, this power grid 
project links four northern Lao provinces and is supposed to enhance regional connectivity (Xinhuanet 
2015). It seems that Chinese companies are very interested in constructing transmission lines that 
connect China with its neighboring countries such as Laos and Myanmar, which are also willing to 
exchange electricity with China. By the year 2035, it is hoped that the power grid system in some of 
these continental Southeast Asian countries could be connected to China’s power grid through 
bilateral, multilateral and regional arrangements (GEIDCO 2018).  
It is also planned that a synchronous power interconnection will be established within Southern China, 
Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand. Currently, in terms of voltage level, only 7 of the existing cross-border 
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transmission lines (one between China and Myanmar, six between Laos and Thailand) are 500 kV. The 
other transmission lines are 230 kV, 110 kV and below. By 2035, the power grids in these countries 
will need to be reinforced. A 500 kV alternating current (AC) synchronous interconnection covering 
Myanmar, Laos, Thailand and Viet Nam has also been recommended. By 2050, the cross-border power 
exchange will reach 16 GW between Thailand and Laos. Therefore, further upgrading of the voltage 
will be required possibly, by deploying ultra-high voltage (UHV) interconnection technology can be 
used based on the existing 500kV AC synchronization grids (GEIDCO 2018). All these projects will 
require a large amount of investment and Chinese companies, with their rich experiences in power 
grid building in the continental Southeast Asian region, would play a key role under this scenario. In 
addition, there is also an urgent need to construct additional power generation capacity to serve a 
region with more than 60 million people without access to electricity.  
Under the BRI, Chinese companies can invest in countries rich in non-fossil energy resources. They 
have already been very active in the hydropower sector in Laos and Myanmar. BRI has also brought 
new opportunities for investment in other forms of renewable power capacity. Chinese companies 
have already exported some US$ 8 billion of solar equipment exports from China, making the country 
the number one exporter of environmental goods and services (Timperley 2018). These continental 
Southeast Asian countries remain an attractive destination for new and renewable energy investment. 
For example, Laos’ energy sector is dominated by hydropower projects along the Mekong river basin. 
The Power Construction Corporation of China has been constructing one of the largest hydropower 
projects in the region with a proposed installed capacity of more than 1,000 MW. Thailand has the 
highest installed solar capacity in the ASEAN region (IRENA 2017). Since BRI started, Chinese investors 
have moved rapidly into Thailand’s solar power sector to build solar panel factories and solar power 
projects, making Thailand a country with a fast increasing solar power capacity and a construction 
centre of solar PV equipment. Malaysia is one of the top three global destinations for renewable 
energy (BMI Research 2017). With its positive macro-economic outlook and supportive energy policies, 
it has attracted several Chinese investments especially in solar and hydropower. One key example is 
the Sarawak Corridor of Renewable Energy, which covers 70,000 sq. km. of the central Sarawak region. 
From 2008 until 2015, 3.3 per cent of all FDI in Sarawak was from China (Chia and Ten 2015). In 2016, 
the largest investment in renewables in Malaysia was made by one of the largest Chinese solar 
manufacturers, LONGi, which is expected to spend about US$ 269 million in the country on solar panel 
manufacturing (Pim 2017). 
Chinese companies, with their existing investments in the power sector in the continental Southeast 
Asian countries such as Laos and Thailand, can provide indirect support to LTMS scenario; and 
probably direct support to this scenario when further down investments in Malaysia and Singapore 
are made. Further, through the construction of power generation transmission capacity, Chinese 
companies, through the BRI, are continuing to contribute to the development of the APG in 
continental Southeast Asia. If this continues, a foundation will have been built for ASEAN to develop 
an integrated power market. Nevertheless, progress may still be hampered by some of the political 
and policy obstacles identified above, in Section 2. 
5.2 BRI under scenario 2 
What Chinese investment can do for ASEAN electricity market integration under scenario 2 is basically 
the same as described in Scenario 1. Yet under scenario 2, it is needed for the GMS region to get China 
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involved in its market integration process. As above mentioned, a 500 kV alternating current (AC) 
synchronous interconnection covering Myanmar, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam is recommended and 
therefore synchronous power interconnection could be established throughout Southern China, Laos, 
Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. The GMS region use BRI as an opportunity to realize such 
interconnection, which is highly possible because Chinese companies have rich experience in power 
grid construction in these countries.  
In addition to the investment in Laos, Thailand and Malaysia, Chinese companies have also 
constructed power plants and power grids in GMS countries such as Vietnam and Cambodia. In 
Cambodia, a country not bordering China, Chinese companies such as China National Heavy Machinery 
Corporation (CHMC) has been very active in the Cambodian electricity market. Together with the 
Cambodia’s state-owned Electricite du Cambodge (EDC), CHMC has committed to constructing the 
national grid in Cambodia and the renovating of its rural power system. Between 2009 and 2012, 
CHMC signed several contracts for power grid construction and expansion, including the Phnom Penh 
Loop Line Transmission System Project, the Cambodian Rural Power Grid Expansion Project (Phase I), 
and the Phnom Penh-Bavet Transmission Line Project (Industrial Headlines 2016). The Phnom Penh 
Loop Line Transmission System connects to transmission lines bringing electricity from all over 
Cambodia, including several hydroelectric dams within the borders of the country and other lines that 
bring electricity from coal and gas power plants in Vietnam (Chun 2009). The Phnom Penh Loop Line 
Transmission System not only improves the electricity supply in Phnom Penh but also enhance the 
supply stability of the entire country. Since the BRI was proposed in 2013, more project contracts have 
been signed by CHMC with relevant Cambodian counterparts. Some contracts are follow-up projects 
of those already existing before the BRI. For example, the Cambodian Rural Power Grid Expansion 
Project (Phase II, Phase III & IV) committed in 2014 and the Cambodian Rural Power Grid Expansion 
Project (Phase V & VI) committed in 2016 (Industrial Headlines 2016). When completed, these projects 
will hopefully transmit electricity to each village of Cambodia.  
Based on the existing power grids and bilateral power trading, Chinese investment may be positively 
engaged in and continue to facilitate grid connection within the GMS. Yet how the GMS multi-lateral 
power trading can bring more transmission lines and how Chinese investment can contribute to GMS 
electricity market integration remains to be seen. The reason is, under scenario 2, the uncertain 
outlook for the GMS electricity market integration blurs the prospect of what and how lines will be 
built. With this said, how the Chinese companies can bring in more lines into this region is also unclear.  
5.3 BRI under scenario 3 
In the third scenario, a competitive electricity market with a fully-developed APG is ASEAN’s ambitious 
plan yet difficult to be realized in the near future. Under this scenario, the fully-established APG will 
require the establishment of power grid interconnection across Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Singapore (BIMPS), which will consist of three synchronous grids given the 
geographical condition. They are the Western Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia (Sumatra-Java), Eastern 
Malaysia-Brunei-Indonesia (Kalimantan), and the Philippines grids. Given archipelagic nature of this 
region, there will only be limited power exchange in the near future. Interconnections between these 
islands have not yet been established and the cross-border electricity trading in Eastern Malaysia, 
Indonesia and the Philippines will remain relatively small. It is expected that by 2050, 400/500 kV 
transmission lines as backbone grids would be constructed in each of the afore-mentioned countries. 
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In Indonesia’s Sumatra and Java Islands, the voltage level of the existing grid could be upgraded to 
1,000 kV considering the land-saving and capacity issues (GEIDCO 2018).  
All these grids require huge investment. However, until now it seems that China is more interested in 
constructing and investing in the lines in continental Southeast Asia. The transmission projects 
undertaken by Chinese companies are nearly all in the GMS region and bilateral in nature. There is no 
evidence to suggest that China’s BRI would strongly support ASEAN’s ambition of region-wide APG or 
full power market integration. The archipelagic characteristics may hinder not only the integration of 
the entire ASEAN electricity market, but also the investment interests of Chinese companies. It seems 
that the BRI may not fit well with this scenario, which requires not only power grids interconnection 
within ASEAN but also third-party electricity flowing through power grids all around ASEAN. 
6. Conclusion 
Using the framework of scenario analysis, this study identifies three possible scenarios of electricity 
market integration in ASEAN. The first scenario is Lao PDR-Thailand-Malaysia-Singapore (LTMS) 
interconnection. This is probably a relatively easy start-up of the eventual ASEAN Power Grid. Given 
the difficulty of getting Singapore involved in the LTMS arrangement, it may be easier to have the 
‘LTM’ in place first. The second scenario is the interconnection of several heterogeneous power grids 
and markets. This is the most likely scenario to be achieved after the LTMS or the ‘LTM’ power trading 
is realized. Such a scenario will possibly take place in the GMS region, which has already had power 
trading on bilateral basis across countries in this region. The third scenario would be a competitive 
electricity market with a fully-developed APG, which requires high-level cooperation and trust among 
ASEAN countries. Under such a scenario, all electricity utilities will have unrestricted and non-
discriminatory grid access to the ASEAN electricity market.  
This study examines how China’s Belt and Road Initiative can facilitate electricity market integration 
under each scenario. It is found that Chinese companies can be most helpful under the first scenario 
and Chinese investments may bring new sources of funding and technology to facilitate the electricity 
market integration in the LTMS, or LTM countries, with more power plants built and more high voltage 
and ultra-high voltage power grids constructed and connected. Under the second scenario, given the 
existing power plants and power grids that they have built, Chinese companies can still be helpful in 
facilitating the interconnection of several heterogeneous grids in the GMS region. However, given the 
indistinctness of the progress of GMS electricity market integration, it remains to be seen that to what 
extent the Chinese investment can help electricity market integration in the region. Compared to the 
contribution the Chinese companies can do under the first scenario, their contribution is not quite 
clear under the second one. Under the third scenario, Chinese investment may play a less important 
role, because it seems that Chinese investment in ASEAN’s power transmission is concentrated in the 
continental Southeast Asian region.  
Further, given the characteristics of archipelago of maritime Southeast Asia, it is projected that there 
will only be limited power exchange in the near future. This may also deter Chinese companies from 
entering into this region. The third scenario is the most difficult arrangement for ASEAN to achieve 
and the least possible situation for BRI to play a role. Despite the difficulty, however, it is still possible 
for China to engage in the third scenario and facilitate the realization of APG. Yet this needs ASEAN as 
a whole to take collective action to make maritime Southeast Asia a region attractive to power sector 
investors. In any sense, how China’s BRI can play a role in the ASEAN electricity market integration 
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depends more on the host countries and on ASEAN rather than on the Chinese side. Against the BRI 
background, the ability for ASEAN countries to manage investments to finance high profile projects 
has become increasingly crucial. At present, ASEAN countries have tended to engage China on a 
bilateral level. In the future, ASEAN governments can collectively play a bigger role in attracting high 
quality projects from China. With a proactive approach, ASEAN countries can make the BRI a truly 
multilateral and sustainable initiative that promotes win-win cooperation, which can lead to a 
sustainable partnership between ASEAN and China. ASEAN and its member states should have their 
own plans as to how to make best use of China’s BRI to encourage it to contribute to the region’s 
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